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a b s t r a c t
Organ transplantation is a vital therapy for the treatment of many patients. Due to blood compatibil-
ity rules, there has been a pattern in many jurisdictions for differing organ types where recipients of
blood type O experience longer waiting times than those of other blood types, partly due to cross-
transplantation of too many O organs to compatible donors of other blood types. In response to this, a
recent development in some jurisdictions is a change in the rules to insist upon ABO-identical transplan-
tation. The literature review herein enables us to conclude that unrestricted cross-transplantation has
not achieved equity of access across all blood groups in any jurisdiction in which the problem has arisen.
The present study next shows that ABO identical transplantation cannot achieve equity, either. It then
presents a model for restricted cross-transplantation which indicates how comparable waiting times for
all blood types could be achieved.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Several prior studies assessing waiting times for solid-organ
transplantation [1–8] have revealed a common and concerning
pattern: recipients of blood type O wait on average substantially
longer than blood type A, while those of blood type A in turn wait
longer than patients with blood type AB. The waiting times for
patients with blood type B are sometimes somewhat longer than
typeO, although this observation is inconsistent [1–8]. Thiswaiting
time pattern for solid-organ transplantation arises in many coun-
tries and/or health-systems, seemingly regardless of organ type. A
Canadian perspective of what has come to be known as the ‘‘blood
type O problem’’ (Glander et al. [3]) dates to our study of adult
liver transplant waiting times in Canada from 2000 to 04 (Stanford
et al. [8]), in which the average waiting time for transplanted O re-
cipients was roughly 10 months, as opposed to 7 months for type
B recipients, 6 months for type A recipients, and merely 3 months
for type AB recipients. Such a discrepancy inwaiting time for a life-
saving intervention raises important ethical questions on equity of
liver transplantation.
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2211-6923/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articTwo recent analyses further illustrate the blood typeOproblem.
In 2010, Glander et al. [3] presented a review of transplantation re-
lated to end-stage renal disease (ESRD) in the Eurotransplant zone
comprising the Benelux countries, Germany, Austria and Slovenia.
Their study involved 1186 patients’ waitlisted for their first kidney
transplant at a single centre in the Eurotransplant zone between
1996 and 2008. As much as 14.1% of type-O donor kidneys were
transplanted into non-O recipients, leading to a disparity of type-
O patients on thewaitlist relative to their proportion in the general
population. Whereas the proportion of blood type O among wait-
listed patients (36.6%) and donors (36%) closely reflected the gen-
eral population, by the end of the study, as much as 47% of waiting
patients were type O. This was accompanied by an 85-month me-
dian waiting time for type-O recipients as opposed to 59 months
for the pooled grouping of A, B, and AB recipients. Investigators
also examined whether the longer waiting times in type 0 recip-
ients might translate into poorer clinical outcomes following re-
nal transplantation and reported statistically significant increased
rates of mortality and graft failure for type-O recipients. (As wait-
ing time equity is our focus, we shall not comment in this study on
the potential health consequences of longerwaiting times. Instead,
we will restrict our attention to possible causes of this inequity in
waiting and propose solutions.)
A follow-up study involving a subset of the same authors,
Liefeldt et al. [5], arrived at similar conclusions. In response to the
le under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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gram (ESP) list, as well as that reported by the Eurotransplant Kid-
ney Allocation program (ETKAS) [5], new rules calling for exclusive
ABO-identical transplantation [5] in the Eurotransplant zone were
introduced in November 2010.
In Canada, deceased donor kidneys are allocated according to an
ABO identical basis. In the case of liver transplantation, ABO com-
patible rules are allowed in the case of urgent transplants, which
happen on the order of 10% of the time. Routine liver transplants
are allocated on an ABO identical basis.
Many other studies – some indirectly – have addressed the
blood type O problem. A list of countries and organ types that il-
lustrates their diversity follows: Rexius et al. [7] [hearts in Swe-
den], Hussey et al. [4] [hearts in the UK], Barone et al. [1] [kidneys
in the US] and Phelan et al. [6] [kidneys in Ireland]. In short, the
blood type O problem occurs for numerous organ types in numer-
ous jurisdictions, with, of course, differences in degree of disparity
in waiting times.
These developments suggest that the impact of ABO-identical
and ABO-compatible transplantation upon patient waiting times
requires further study. The present work aims to address this from
the perspective of a new queuing construct, which we name the
‘‘array of idealised transplant queues’’ (AITQ). The structure is so
named because, unlike separate queues, we present a model in
which donor organs of a particular type can be used for recipients
of specified compatible blood groups, and as such, some of the four
waitlists or queues are linked. The array is ‘‘idealised’’ in that, as a
mathematical structure, not all aspects affecting the transplanta-
tion process are considered, and a number of simplifying assump-
tions are made (which are detailed in Section 2). Nonetheless, we
have retained the key parameters in the wait list process from a
queuing perspective, andwe believe that we can properly infer the
qualitative impact of deviations from the assumptions stated be-
low in such situations as may present themselves.
In the next section, after defining the structure of the AITQ, we
establish results which show that the time on the waitlist in such
an idealised system is inversely proportional to the rate at which
donor organs become available. The significance of this fact is that,
in an AITQ operating under an ABO-identical policy, patients from
the rarer blood groups of a given region would wait on average
many times longer than the common blood types. For instance, in
Canada where blood type O is about 15 times more common than
blood type AB [9], the impact of an ABO-identical scheme, strictly
adhered to, would be to see waiting times for AB patients on the
order of 15 times longer than those of type O. The corresponding
impact for blood type B patients would be a five-fold increase
relative to blood type O.
While it has not been proven in the literature above that an
unconstrained amount ABO-compatible cross-transplantation is in
itself inherently incapable of leading to equity in access, we are
convinced by the sheer variety of jurisdictions and organ types
considered above that this will be the typical outcome when such
a policy is employed. When combined with the results of Section 2
that show that comparable waiting times for the various blood
types cannot be achieved under ABO-identical transplantation, we
feel that the case has been made for a third option lying between
these two extremes. In Section 3, we present what is required,
from the perspective of the AITQ model, to achieve comparable
waiting times for all blood groups. The central thrust of what we
establish is that limited amounts of cross-transplantation must be
allowed to achieve equity, but only between specified blood types,
based uniquely upon the blood mix of the given jurisdiction. We
use the Canadian blood mix to illustrate these concepts. We then
illustrate how these results can be modified in other jurisdictions.
We summarise our results and discuss future work in the final
section of the paper.While it is the problemof transplantwaiting times that gave rise
to the AITQ structure, the conclusions that we obtain herein apply
to any array of queues in which the various component queues
feature arrival rates and service capacity in a set proportion to each
other, and inwhich some service capacity can be diverted fromone
of the queues to another.
We do not, in the present work, address issues relating to the
development of transplantation policies to achieve the optimal
amount of cross transplantation. First, such issues are properly ad-
dressed in the medical literature, which we hope to pursue in fu-
ture work. Second, what is allowed in one jurisdiction may not be
possible in another, for legislative, constitutional, or cultural rea-
sons, among others.
2. Waiting times for an array of idealised transplant queues
operating under an ABO-identical protocol:
2.1. Background on donor organ and recipient placement distribu-
tions:
In transplant queues, the service time constitutes the time be-
tween consecutive deceased donor organs becoming available.
Stanford et al. [8], in their study of liver transplant waiting times
in Canada from 2000–2004, observed that the process of deceased
donor organs becoming availablewas adequately approximated by
a Poisson process. The Poisson-arrivals assumption is widely borne
out in large populations (say, of size n), in which individual mem-
bers of the population each have a rare chance p of manifesting
a particular characteristic (see Feller [10], page 153). Since inter-
event times from a Poisson process are exponentially distributed
(see Conway et al. [11]), this means that we are free to consider the
time between consecutive deceased donor organs becoming avail-
able to be exponentially distributed.
In contrast, patient placements on thewaiting lists are not Pois-
son, at least as was observed in the Canadian liver transplant con-
text in Stanford et al. [8]. While the need for a transplant might
well arise in the population at large, there are several subsequent
steps involved prior to placement on a transplant waiting list: the
patient’s decision to seek treatment, the consult with their primary
care provider, the referral to the specialist, and possible further de-
lays. The length of thewaiting list, at any time the decision to place
is being considered, might itself play a role. The net result we ob-
served in Stanford et al. [8] regarding the patient placement pro-
cesses was such that the six regional Canadian waitlists all failed
Poisson goodness of fit tests, after all of these factors have been
taken into consideration. In some cases, a geometric distribution
for the daily number placements was found to be suitable.
This combination of a non-Poisson arrival process and exponen-
tial service times would seem to suggest the use of a GI/M/1 queue
for modelling purposes, as we shall see below.
2.2. The array of idealised transplant queues (AITQ) model:
We propose below an idealised transplant queue model which
reflects the most important factors that affect waiting time. The
resulting idealised model can be stated as follows.
Patients are placed on the waitlist for patients of blood-type
i; i = O,A, B,AB according to a renewal process (see Kleinrock
[12]). The distribution of time between successive patient place-
ments for the ith waitlist is given by
Fi (t) = Prob {Ti ≤ t} ; t ≥ 0; i = O,AB,AB
where Ti denotes the random variable representing the time be-
tween successive placements for waitlist i. We assume that the pa-
tient placement process has reached stationarity; i.e., there is no
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growth from year to year in the long-term rate at which patients
are added to the list. Patients on the ith waitlist are served in FCFS
fashion, and there is a single server (representing the organ avail-
ability process of the ith blood type). The times between successive
organs of the same blood type becoming available are exponen-
tially distributed at rate µi; i = O,A, B,AB. We assume that each
blood group has the same propensity to donate cadaveric organs
and the same need for transplant and as such, each queue can be
viewed as a time-scaled version of the others. Furthermore, we as-
sume that the (common) long-run cadaveric supply for the four
blood types is enough to meet the demand:
1/(µiE {Ti}) = ρ < 1; i = O,A, B,AB.
We further assume the existence of the moment generating
functions mi (s) for the inter-placement time distributions (see
Feller [10] p 285) defined by
mi (s) =
 ∞
x=0
esxdFi (x) ; i = O,A, B and AB.
Last, to account for blood compatibility of select types of cross-
transplantation, we observe that it is possible to re-assign service
capacity from theOqueue toA, B, andAB recipients; aswell as from
the A queue and the B queue to type AB recipients. Themechanism
by which this service capacity is re-assigned is a coin toss with
probability pij each time an organ of type i becomes available;
i = O, A, B and AB. In the foregoing, j indicates the blood type
of the compatible recipient class. We presume that the amount
of redirected organs is sufficiently small that each of the queues
remains stable. Typically, it is the case that the permissible pij‘s will
be small (on the order of, say, two to five percent for anydonor class
in total, as we show in Section 3).
The model we will be proposing illustrates these ideas in Fig. 1.
The ABO-compatible pairings are those indicated by dashed or
solid lines. The dashed lines indicate those pairings we will disal-
low, for reasons to follow. Hence, we set pOA = pO(AB) = pB(AB) = 0
while allowing pOB > 0 and pA(AB) > 0.
For the AITQ model as constructed, we observe that each of the
four idealised transplant queues operates as a GI/M/1 queue (see
Kleinrock [12]). Before making use of this fact, we address several
aspects in which the AITQ as formulated differs from transplant
queues in reality and provide justification for our choices.
First, one could question the choice of an FCFS service disci-
pline for the idealised model, when in many real situations sicker
patients gain access to transplantation quicker than healthy ones.
In the first instance, we observe that such models have been con-
sidered; we note in particular that Drekic et al. [13] considers a
so-called ‘‘self-promoting’’ model in which customers of a regu-
lar priority are promoted to high priority upon the occurrence of
a randomly-occurring health event. These events can also lead toabandonment from the regular queue due to either an improve-
ment in health status such that transplantation is no longer desir-
able, as well as abandonment due to death or health degradation
to the point that transplantation is no longer an option.
With regard to abandonments, it is true that long waiting times
lead to a greater incidence of degraded health and death. Method-
ologically, a model incorporating abandonments would violate the
GI/M/1 queue structure we use to establish the results that follow.
A model that incorporates such aspects will yield shorter wait-
ing times for patients who remain than an FCFS queue without
abandonment would. The long waiting times that our model will
forecast act as a good proxy for undesirable scenarios where aban-
donments aremore likely to arise. Our focus here is to seek a cross-
transplantation mechanism that can provide comparable access to
patients of all blood types in a timely manner.
Remark. One referee’s observation which we have not pursued
herein warrants mention. The referee observes that as the need
for transplants among the population at large is likely to resemble
a Poisson process, an array of idealised M/M(n)/1 models would
reflect the abandonment processes more accurately. Such a model
would start the waiting time ‘‘clock’’ from time of need and could
provide useful benchmarks for real-world systems.We are inclined
to agree with the merit of this approach.
Patient health does affect their waiting time; for instance, the
Modified End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD) score [14] is used widely
to allocated livers. When prioritised systems are in effect in a
system without abandonments, the overall average waiting time
for a given blood type is unaffected, as guaranteed by the GI/G/1
conservation law (see Kleinrock [15]). In other words, while a
prioritised system will provide better service to the patients most
in need, there is no net benefit to a larger fraction of patients as
a whole. The initial purpose of our AITQ model is to illustrate that
ABO-identical transplantationwill lead to shorterwaiting times for
larger blood groups than for the others. This effect is most easily
illustrated in an FCFS environment.
We are certainly not recommending the abandonment of
MELD-based allocation of livers. Assuming that transplantation is
the desired therapy for all patients on the waitlist, and since the
MELD score merely rearranges the order in which patients are
transplanted, it is sufficient for us to consider a first-come, first-
served (FCFS) queue in order to address the adequacy of an ABO-
identical transplantation policy in the long term.MELD and similar
sickest-first strategies will not correct a policy with profoundly
differing waiting times for the various blood types.
Our coin toss mechanism is made purely for methodological
reasons which will become apparent. It is the goal of this paper
to establish that a strategy to allow a small, controlled amount
of cross-transplantation can produce the desired balance yield-
ing comparable waiting times for all classes. It is not our pur-
pose herein to specify the details implementing such a strategy.
The proper discussion on implementable strategies belongs in the
medical literature.
As the dominant research questions here are (1) to establish
that an ABO-identical policy cannot be maintained in the long run
on the grounds of equity and fairness, and (2) to then establish
that a model with restricted amounts of cross-transplantation can
do so, we need a model that is sufficiently transparent to reveal
the impact of the primary factors on waiting time (such as organ
availability rates and chances of cross-transplantation). Thus, we
need to avoid being opaque due to secondary yet important factors
such as the stationarity and independence assumptions.
Indeed, it is unlikely in any given jurisdiction that the avail-
ability of donor organs and the need for transplantation are un-
affected by public service campaigns to encourage donors signing
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provements in automobile safety, and medical advances that are
saving more lives (and thereby depleting the sources of deceased
donor organs). Unfortunately, the transient models required to re-
flect these developmentsmore accurately are typically intractable,
and even if they were tractable, they would almost certainly be
opaque in terms of trying to discern the impact of the primary fac-
tors listed above.
As regards the independence assumption, we observe that the
process of placing patients on thewaitlist is certainly influenced by
the human interaction. It is unclear whether the interactions of the
attending physician and the multidisciplinary panel governing the
waitlist, in seeking the best outcomes for a patient who could ben-
efit from a transplant, might seek to place several of them on the
list at an ‘‘opportune’’ time. Hence in fact the assumption of succes-
sive placement times being independent of each other may in fact
be false. However, as the number of physicians involved is large,
it is hard to imagine how one would be able to assess this interac-
tion in a straightforward way. Primarily for reasons of tractability
and transparency of the results in terms of the primary factors, it
is necessary for us to proceed with the independence assumption.
The assumption that the long-run cadaveric supply for the four
blood types is sufficient to meet the demand is difficult to assess in
a simplemanner. Certainly, at present notable numbers of patients
die while waiting for many organ types in many jurisdictions, and
it is likely the case that if none did, the waitlists would grow over
time. This assumption is needed in order to invoke the stationary
results for queues that we do.
We close this assessment by noting that such factors as organ
size, and compatibility due tomedical factors other than blood type
have been ignored.
We turn now to our results. In what follows, we consider the
AITQ as formulated and find that ABO identical transplantation is
unsustainable in that, for the Canadian blood type mix (and West-
ern nations with similar mixes), it penalises patients from blood
groups B and AB. We then propose a modification to a strict ABO-
identical policy inwhich limited amounts of transplantation are al-
lowed between specific pairs of blood types and demonstrate that
such a modified policy is sustainable in the long run.
2.3. Waiting times on the AITQ waitlists
Each of the queues comprising the AITQ features a renewal pro-
cess for patient placements and has an exponential service mecha-
nism for the organ inter-availability times. Based on these facts and
the other assumptions noted above, eachwaiting list can be viewed
as a stable GI/M/1 queue (see, for instance, Kleinrock [12]), so it fol-
lows that the sojourn time a patient spends on the relevantwait list
is exponentially distributed. DefiningW to be the time from arrival
until completion of service for a randomly selected customer in the
GI/M/1 queue, the sojourn time distribution satisfies
P (W > t) = e−µ (1−r0)t; t ≥ 0. (1)
where 0 < r0 < 1 is the unique solution to the implicit equation
r0 = m (−µ (1− r0)). Hence the average sojourn time (which cor-
responds to a patient’s average time on the waitlist) is given by
W = 1
µ (1− r0) . (2)
A notable consequence of Eqs. (1) and (2) is that anymechanism
that manages to equate average waiting times between two com-
ponents of the AITQ (such as, for instance, type O and type B) will
also succeed in equating the percentiles of the waiting time dis-
tributions for all t ≥ 0. (This fact will prove relevant in Section 3
below.)2.4. Assessing waiting times under ABO-identical transplantation
Under an ABO identical policy, each of the four blood groups can
be considered as its own transplant queue. We have assumed that
there is no variation in the propensity to donate from one blood
group to another, and that the per capita rate of patients requir-
ing transplantation is the same from blood group to blood group.
(The available data in the studies referred to in the Introduction
seems to support these assumptions.) These assumptions imply
that the donor rates and arrival rates are in the same proportion for
all blood groups. The inter-placement time distributions are there-
fore scaled versions of each other with the same scale factor that
links the donor rates, which is a (mild) condition (3) of the theo-
rem that follows.Whilewe illustrate the result for the case of blood
groupsO and B, the same conclusion results for type-A and type-AB
patients if the same condition is satisfied. Let r (O)0 and r
(B)
0 denote
the respective roots for the separate blood type O and type B sys-
tems, respectively.
Theorem. Let f = µB/µO be the ratio of organ availability rates
for blood types B and O respectively. Furthermore assume that the
moment-generating functions
mi (s) =
 ∞
x=0
esxdFi (x) ; i = O, B
exist for the patient inter-placement time distributions FO (t) and
FB (t), and that these are scaled by the same factor that links the donor
rates (f ), i.e.
FB (t) = Prob {TB ≤ t} = FO (ft) = Prob {TO ≤ ft} , ∀t ≥ 0. (3)
Then r (O)0 = r (B)0 .
Proof of Theorem. The root r (B)0 is the solution to the equation
r (B)0 = mB

−µB

1− r (B)0

.
In light of Eq. (3), it can be shown readily that
mB (s) = mO

s
f

, ∀s
so that
r (B)0 = mO

−µB
f

1− r (B)0

= mO

−µO

1− r (B)0

.
Thus r (B)0 is a solution to the defining equation for the root r
(O)
0 . As
the solution to this equation the interval (0,1) is unique, the result
follows. 
Lemma. Let us use r0 to denote the common value of r
(O)
0 and r
(B)
0
under the assumptions of the foregoing theorem. Then the average
waiting times for type- B patients will be (1/f ) times larger than those
of type O; that is:
WB = WOf . (4)
Proof of Lemma. From Eq. (2) above we find immediately that
WB = 1
µB(1− r0) =
1
fµO(1− r0)
= WO
f
. 
Remark. The consequence of the foregoing theorem is that under
an ABO identical policy, since O organs become available at roughly
five times the rate that B organs do in the Canadian context, and
fifteen times the rate that AB organs [9], Eq. (4) illustrates that
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patients will be, respectively, about five and fifteen times as long
as that of blood O patients. Hence, an ABO-identical strategy is an
unsustainable model if equity of access for all blood groups is an
aim of the allocation policy.
We turn now to proposing a controlled model for cross-
transplantation that does meet this objective.
3. Proposed model for limited cross-transplantation
Since the literature has shown that uncontrolled cross-
transplantation adversely affects the blood type O population, on
the one hand, and we have shown above on the other that an ABO-
identical policy is inequitable on the other hand, one can conclude
that an equitable policymust lie between these extremes. That is, it
is necessary to allow some cross-transplantation to occur, but one
must strive to keep its occurrence less frequent than under existing
ABO-compatible policies which have negatively impacted type-O
waiting times, in order to provide comparable access to organs for
all blood types.
We propose a policy which permits limited amounts of cross-
transplantation between specified pairings of donor and recipient
blood types, while precluding all other ABO-compatible pairings.
We illustrate the approach below in the Canadian context [9] (and
anticipate similar outcomes in other jurisdictions with a similar
blood mix). We then comment on what aspects would differ in ju-
risdictions whose blood type mixes are dissimilar to the Canadian
case.
The process of identifying the donor and recipient blood types
for permissible cross-transplantation is based upon the following
logic that applies in the Canadian context (see Fig. 2):
1. Since blood group B deceased donor organs do not arise quickly
enough to provide the same timely access for a transplant as
the larger blood groups O and A, they must be supplemented
by some amount of cross-transplanted organs — and the only
compatible source is blood group 0.
2. Similarly, blood group AB deceased donor organs are too few
in number to offer timely access, so they too must be supple-
mented by some cross-transplanted organs. While organs from
all of blood groups O, A, or B are all compatible to type AB, it
is preferable in practice for the greatest medical commonality
to be preserved between the donor and the recipient. As such,
donor organs of types A and B are preferred to those of type O.
3. Transplants for AB recipients from blood type Bwould only lead
to more transfers from O to B to ensure timely access for type
B patients. We need to limit the demand upon type O donors to
type B patients who constitute 9% of the population. Hence, the
logical source for the type AB recipients is blood group A.
The foregoing line of thought for the Canadian context can be
adjusted for other jurisdictions having similar blood type mixes
with higher proportions of O and A type blood, a substantially
smaller proportion of B, and a very small proportion of type AB.
In contrast, for countries whose blood mix includes almost equal
proportions of O, A, and B type blood, such as Korea [16], the de-
tails of the solution using this approachwould need to bemodified
accordingly. In Korea, the closer compatibility of AB type recipients
to A and B type donors (as opposed to type O donors) would seem
to suggest cross-transplantation based upon small numbers of A
and B type donors to achieve equity of access to AB recipients.
The resulting policy we propose is a modification of an ABO-
identical policy which allows for a small fraction pO of type O or-
gans to be transplanted into type B recipients, and another small
fraction pA of type A organs to be transplanted into type AB recip-
ients (see Fig. 3).Fig. 2. Permissible donor/recipient pairs (solid arrows). Dashed arrows indicate the
disallowed compatible pairs: O-type to AB-type not medically preferred; B-type to
AB-type would lead to more transfers from O-type to B-type; and O-type to A-type
disadvantages type-O patients.
Fig. 3. Available donor organ flows & allocation to recipient groups (O-to-B case).
The resulting allocation of available deceased donor organs to
type O and type B patients is evident in Fig. 3:
Using the properties pertaining to Poisson processes in Conway
et al. [11], page 144, it can be shown directly that the process of
O-type organs retained for O-type recipients is a Poisson process
at rate µO (1− pO), and the process of O organs made available
for B-type recipients is a Poisson process at rate µOpO, so long as
the chance any given organ is selected for cross-transplantation re-
mains at pO, independently of all the others.1 It also follows from
the same page of Conway et al. [11] that the resulting aggregate
process of deceased donor organs made available to type-B recipi-
ents is a Poisson process at rate µB + µO pO.
The goal of ensuring fair access is achieved by equating the
mean sojourn timesWO andWB; this in turn will lead to the same
probabilities of waiting t time units for a transplant. The resulting
equation is
WO = (µO(1− pO − rO))−1 = WB = (µB(1− rO)+ µO pO)−1.
Solving this equation for pO in terms of the other parameters leads
to the equation
pO = (R− 1)(1− rO)2R
where R = µO
µB
= 1/f is the ratio of the rates at which deceased
donor organs of type O and type B become available. In the Cana-
dian context in which µO ∼= 5µB, this means that
pO ∼= 0.4 (1− rO) .
Proceeding in the same way to determine pA, since µA ∼= 14µAB,
we find that
pA ∼= 0.46(1− rO).
1 This is purely a modelling assumption, and we are certainly not recommending
it be the actual rule for determining the destination of the organs in practice. We
comment further on this point in the discussion.
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Optimal cross-transplant probability pO .
rho D/M/1 M/M/1 H2/M/1
rO PO rO pO rO pO
0.9 0.807 0.0772 0.9 0.04 0.955 0.0179
0.93 0.863 0.0547 0.93 0.028 0.969 0.0123
0.96 0.921 0.0316 0.96 0.016 0.983 0.0069
0.99 0.980 0.0080 0.99 0.004 0.996 0.0017
Table 1 determines the optimal pO value as a function of the
occupancy level, for deterministic arrivals, Poisson arrivals, and
a particular hyper-exponential inter-arrival time distribution. The
particular hyper-exponential distribution is the same as was used
in Stanford et al. [8], featuring balanced means and a squared
coefficient of variation of 3.77.
Since transplant waitlists are never empty, it is appropriate to
presume a ρ value close to unity. Working with what we consider
a very low estimate of ρ = 0.9, and observing that rO = ρ in the
M/M/1 case, we find that pO and pA will not exceed 4% and 4.6%
of organs respectively — and in fact are likely to be much smaller,
ensuring that cross-transplantation is indeed kept rare.
As the table illustrates, pO is typically about twice as large for
deterministic arrivals as it is for Poisson arrivals. Conversely, it
is typically only about half as large for the more variable hyper-
exponential inter-arrival times. Since Stanford et al. [8] found that
the patient placement process was more variable than a Poisson
process, it is likely that one can use pO ∼= 0.4 (1− ρ) as an up-
per bound on the frequency of cross-transplantation of O organs
to B patients. The specific optimal value will of course ultimately
depend upon a host of other factors, such as the identification of
a medically and ethically acceptable allocation mechanism, tested
via extensive simulation, which will be pursued in future work in
the medical literature.
4. Discussion
The foregoing analysis has established that it is possible to
achieve comparable waiting times for solid-organ transplant in all
blood groups by allowing a small amount of cross-transplantation
from type O donors to type B recipients, and from type A donors
to type AB recipients. The degree of cross-transplantation needs
to be carefully controlled, however, to ensure it does not lead
to a repetition of the practises that have given rise to the blood
type O problem. The mechanism by which the allocation is done
in the queuing model presented here — subjecting each organ as
it becomes available to the same random chance of being cross-
transplanted, independent of all other factors — was done for rea-
sons of mathematical tractability of the results obtained. In reality,
pO and pA must equal the long run fraction of cross-transplanted
organs. From uniquely a waiting time perspective, the manner in
which waiting times should be equalised should be dynamic, pe-
riodically allowing or disallowing the O → A and A → AB cross-
transplantation so as to keep the waiting times on the waitlists in
balance. However, such a perspective ignores all medical consider-
ations beyond waiting time. Implementable strategies need to be
developed which reflect medical decision-making first and fore-
most, with issues such as waiting times relegated to second place
due to their long run impact on the health of patients awaiting
transplantation. The development of such strategies will be pur-
sued in future work: first in the context of liver transplantation
in Canada, and then broadening in scope to consider other organs
domestically, and in other jurisdictions. Thus, the conclusions ob-
tained from the AITQ model presented herein have the potential
to have broad implications for public health policy and issues of
equity of access for transplant patients in general.It is a non-trivial task to infer what the results would look like
for any waitlist in which the patient placement rate exceeds the
organ availability rate. What one can say is that any such waitlist
only achieves ‘‘stability’’ by patients coming off the waitlist, due to
death, becoming too ill to transplant, recovering one’s healthwhile
waiting, and so on. In this context, one cannot ignore the priority
aspects, as sicker patients will gain access sooner. In turn, healthy
patientswillwait longer, to the point that someof them suffer a de-
graded health status, and so on. Clearly, models to consider these
interactions are a worthy area for future study. Nonetheless, the
track record of the past decades reveals that ad hoc cross trans-
plantation has been shown repeatedly to disadvantage patients of
typeO. On the other hand,we have shown that ABO-identicalwait-
lists are such that there are too few organs from the smaller blood
groups to provide comparable access on their own. Thus, while
our model cannot determine mathematically what the ideal cross-
transplantation frequency rate should be in such a context, one can
nonetheless show that some cross-transplantation will be needed,
and it is our opinion that it is likely to entail the pairings we have
identified formany countries in Europe and the Americas, and pos-
sibly in Africa. As the Asian blood type mix is substantially differ-
ent, a different arrangement would be needed.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank both referees, whose suggestions
have improved many aspects of the paper substantially. We also
wish to thank many unnamed individuals for their comments
when thiswork has developed. In particular, Dr. Stanfordwishes to
thank an un-named student at the University of Hong Kong, who
first pointed out the preference for A and B organs for AB recip-
ients over those organs of type O. Jung-Min Lee was funded by
Dr. Stanford’s NSERC operating grant.
References
[1] M. Barone, A.W. Avolio, A. Di Leo, P. Burra, A. Francavilla, ABO blood group-
related waiting list disparities in liver transplant candidates: effect of the
MELD adoption, Transplantation 85 (2008) 844–849.
[2] G.M. Danovich, J.M. Cecka, Allocation of deceased donor kidneys: past, present,
and future, Am. J. Kidney Dis. 42 (2003) 882–890.
[3] P. Glander, K. Budde, D. Schmidt, T.F. Fuller, M. Giessing, H.-H. Neumayer,
L. Liefeldt, The ‘blood group O problem’ in kidney transplantation — time to
change? Nephrol. Dial. Transplant. 25 (2010) 1998–2004.
[4] J.C. Hussey, J. Parameshwar, N.R. Banner, Influence of blood group onmortality
and waiting time before heart transplantation in the United Kingdom:
implications for equity of access, J. Heart Lung Transplant. 26 (2007) 30–33.
[5] L. Liefeldt, K. Budde, P. Glander, Accumulation of elderly ESRD patients with
blood group O on the waiting list, letter to editors, Transplant. Int. 24 (2011)
e83–e84.
[6] P.J. Phelan, P. O’Kelly, D. O’Neill, D. Little, D. Hickey, M. Keogan, J. Walshe,
C. Magee, P.J. Conlon, Analysis of waiting times on Irish renal transplant list,
Clin. Transplant. 24 (2010) 381–385.
[7] H. Rexius, F. Nilsson, A. Jeppsson, On the allocation of cardiac allografts from
blood group-O donors, Scand. Cardiovasc. J. 36 (2002) 342–344.
[8] D.A. Stanford, E.M. Renouf, V.C. McAlister, Waiting for liver transplantation in
Canada:waitlist history 2000–04 and sensitivity analysis for the future, Health
Care Manag. Sci. 11 (2008) 184–195.
[9] Percentage of Blood Types In Canada. Retrieved from Canadian Blood Services
website: http://www.blood.ca/centreapps/internet/uw_v502_mainengine.
nsf/page/Percentage-of-Blood-Types-In-Canada?OpenDocument (accessed
31.10.13).
[10] W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications, Wiley,
New York, 1968.
[11] R.W. Conway, W.L. Maxwell, L.W. Miller, Theory of Scheduling, Addison-
Wesley, Reading, Mass, 1967.
[12] L. Kleinrock, Queueing Systems, Volume I: Theory, Wiley, New York, 1975.
[13] S. Drekic, D.A. Stanford, D.G. Woolford, A self-promoting priority model
for transplant queues, Invited talk, in: 1st INFORMS Healthcare Conference,
Montreal, Quebec, June, 2011.
[14] R. Wiesner, E. Edwards, R. Freeman, A. Harper, R. Kim, P. Kamath, et al.,
Model for end-stage liver disease (MELD) and allocation of donor livers,
Gastroenterology 24 (2003) 91–96.
[15] L. Kleinrock, Queueing Systems, Volume II: Computer Applications, Wiley,
New York, 1975.
[16] http://www.bloodbook.com/world-abo.html. Online search, November 8th
2012.
